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THE EMPLOYEE'S "FREE AND CLEAR CHOICE"
By EVERETT M. GOULARDt
T HERE is a saying that "an object in possession seldom retains the same
charm that it had in pursuit." During the years since the airline in-
dustry has been under the coverage of the Railway Labor Act (herein-
after cited as Act or RLA), carriers have pursued, perhaps with changing
tempos but with a fixed determination, an extremely elusive object in the
representation area-the allowance of a "no-union" slot on the ballot form.
As we all know, this object has never been "possessed" and it appears at
the moment not to be within easy reach. Nevertheless, I believe that we
will learn within the next few years whether this object in possession does
have charm. The "charm" of a "no-union" slot concept is the belief that
the "free and clear choice" of the employees will be recorded accurately,
efficiently and speedily. I believe its realization would not tarnish that
"charm." Therefore, the purpose of my remarks is simple. It is to show
that the absence of a "no-union" slot on the ballot creates confusion which
will persist until employees are able to record their "free and clear choice."
The right of an employee within the coverage of the RLA to choose
his own collective bargaining representative is provided in section 2, Fourth
of the RLA. The machinery for this selection is in section 2, Ninth of that
Act. Section 2, Fourth states that "Employees shall have the right to organ-
ize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to
determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class . .. .
Section 2, Ninth authorizes the National Mediation Board, upon request,
to investigate disputes over representation to "designate" those who were
affected, to use a secret ballot or any other appropriate means of ascer-
taining the choice of the employees, to establish rules governing elections
and to certify representatives chosen to represent employees in negotiations.
Coexistent with the employees' statutory right to select their own col-
lective bargaining representative is the corresponding right of the em-
ployees to reject collective representation. The legislative history of the
RLA supports the view that employees under the Act have the right to
reject collective representation. The House Report on the bill H.R. 9861
states:
2. It [H.R. 9861] provides that employees shall be free to join any labor
union of their choice and likewise be free to refrain from joining any union
if that be their desire and forbids interference by the carrier's officers with the
exercise of said rights.'
t A.B., Cornell University; LL.B., Harvard Law School; member of the Bar of New York; Vice
President, Industrial Relations, Pan American Airways.
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Testimony by Commissioner Joseph P. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of
Transportation and the principal draftsman of the legislation, reflected
contemporary thoughts on the bill:
Commissioner Eastman: No, it does not require collective bargaining on the
part of the employees. If the employees do not wish to organize, prefer to
deal individually with the management with regard to these matters, why,
that course is left open to them, or it should be.'
Likewise in the Senate, Senator Robert Wagner, supporter of this legisla-
tion, expressed an equal belief as to the purpose of the bill:
Senator Wagner: ... I didn't understand these provisions compelled an em-
ployee to join any particular union. I thought the purpose of it was just the
opposite, to see that the men have absolute liberty to join or not join any
union or to remain unorganized.'
From the above, the legislative history clearly reflects the prevailing con-
sensus at the time of the 1934 amendments to the RLA that the employee
under the Act did indeed possess the right to reject collective representation.
In addition, the Supreme Court in the case of Brotherhood of Railway
Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees,' (here-
inafter referred to as the ABNE case) acknowledged in a footnote that
"the legislative history supports the view that the employees are to have
the option of rejecting collective representation. '
Regrettably, the National Mediation Board (hereinafter cited as NMB),
the official body established to resolve questions arising out of disputes
over representation, has not considered itself a vehicle through which the
employees may express their desire either for or against collective repre-
sentation. Rather, the NMB has played a partisan role designed to en-
courage employees to choose collective representation, as is amply evi-
dent from its statement in Twenty Years Under the Railway Labor Act,
Amended, and the National Mediation Board:
According to the act, such representatives may either be a person or persons,
or a labor union or organization, designated either by the employees of a
single carrier or the employees of a group of carriers, to act for them. The
thing of importance in this connection is that the interests of the employees,
like the interests of the carriers, shall be looked after by representatives of
their own choosing. In other words, the act does not contemplate that its
purposes shall be achieved, nor is it clear that they can be achieved, without
employee representatives--that is to say, by carriers treating separately with
each employee.'
Consequently, the NMB has shaped the form of the ballot to its own
purposes.
COMMERCE, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). H.R. 9861 was enacted into law on June 21, 1934 as
the 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act.
Hearings on H.R. 7650 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1934).
I Hearings on S. 3266 Before the Senate, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
4 380..U.S. 650 (1965).
5Id. at 669, n.5.
I NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, TWENTY YEARS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, AMENDED,
AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, (1955) at 14.
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Prior to the ABNE case, the NMB adopted two major practices in rep-
resentation proceedings: (1) It certified as the collective bargaining rep-
resentative of the employees a union which received a majority of the
votes cast, provided that in the election a majority of the eligible voters
participated; and (2) it used an election ballot which did not provide a
"no-union" slot for those who wanted to vote against representation.
The practice of certifying a union on the basis of a majority of votes
cast (provided a majority of those eligible to vote did so) was sanctioned
in Virginia R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40," wherein the exact mean-
ing of the term "majority" as included in section 2, Fourth of the RLA
was questioned by the carrier. System Federation No. 40 attempted to or-
ganize the crafts of the carrier's mechanical department. As to one of
these crafts, the blacksmiths, the System Federation failed to receive a ma-
jority of the ballots of those eligible to vote, although a majority of the
craft participated in the election. The NMB certified the System Federa-
tion as the bargaining representative on the ground that it received a
majority of the votes cast. The carrier attacked the certification on the
ground that less than a majority of the eligible voters had expressed a de-
sire for union representation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit posed the issue as being "whether, in such an election, the choice is
dependent upon a majority of all those qualified to vote, or whether, in
cases where a majority of those qualified to vote participate in the election,
a majority of the votes cast is sufficient."' The court then determined that
the latter alternative was the more logical interpretation of the word "ma-
jority" as set forth in section 2, Fourth. The Supreme Court affirmed the
Fourth Circuit's holding, noting that "those who do not participate 'are
presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting'. '
The second major pre-ABNE practice of the NMB was its refusal to
include a "no-union" slot on the ballot. The ballot had slots only for
named unions or individuals or for "others," and a ballot marked "no
representation" was considered invalid.
These two practices made the employee's right to reject collective rep-
resentation illusory. This illusion arose out of the presumption, enunciated
by the Supreme Court in the Virginia R. Co. case, that those who did not
participate in the election were presumed to have assented to the will of
the majority who had voted. The danger of such a presumption became
apparent when viewed in connection with the absence of a "no-union"
slot on the election ballot. If the employee wanted to vote against collec-
tive representation, he would not vote; yet, under the presumption of the
Virginia R. Co. case, his vote against representation would be switched to
a vote for representation.
Significantly, after the Virginia A. Co. case was decided, the National
Labor Relations Board (hereinafter cited as NLRB) changed its ballot
from one without a "no-union" slot to one with such a box in order to
784 F.2d 641 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 300 U.S. 5 (1936).
84 F.2d at 652.
'300 U.S. at 560.
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protect the employee's right to reject collective representation. Unlike the
NMB, the NLRB had a practice of certifying a union on the basis of a
majority of the votes cast provided that those votes were representative
numerically of the total eligible to vote. Had the NLRB continued to op-
erate under such a certification policy and not included a "no-union" slot
on the ballot, the employee would not have been able to cast a vote against
representation, because whenever the employee abstained from voting, the
Virginia R. Co. presumption would interpret that vote as one for repre-
sentation.
The ABNE case arose out of a merger in 1961 between United Airlines
and Capital Airlines, at which time the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks
(hereinafter cited as BRC) was certified as the representative of the "cler-
ical, office, stores, fleet and passenger service" employees at Capital. After
the merger United, the dominant partner, refused to recognize this con-
tract. In 1962 BRC filed an application with the NMB to investigate a
representation dispute among these employees of United. Over the objec-
tions of the carrier and the IAM, the rival union representing the stores
and fleet service personnel at United, the NMB ordered an election in the
entire unit to determine which of the two unions was the bargaining rep-
resentative. The carrier filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, in part attacking the form of the ballot because it
provided no space for voting "no-union." The court dismissed the action,
and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Thereafter an
association for non-contract employees of the carrier filed a suit in the
same district court raising substantially the same claims. The district court
enjoined the NMB from conducting an election without a ballot providing
for a "no-union" slot. The court of appeals affirmed.
Presumably becoming uncertain about the form of its ballot, the NMB
amended it after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, but before a de-
cision was issued. At the urging of the Solicitor General, the following
language was included:
No employee is required to vote.
If less than a majority of the employees cast valid ballots no representative
will be certified.
This change did not alleviate the existing problem because of the Vir-
ginia R. Co. presumption. Even if an employee had "voted" against rep-
resentation by not voting at all, his "vote" was turned into a vote for rep-
resentation under the presumption.
The Supreme Court did not resolve the inconsistency between the bal-
lot form and the Virginia R. Co. presumption, even though the Court
noted that the NMB had not followed the presumption. It held that the
Board's choice of its proposed ballot did not exceed its statutory authority.
At the same time, in stating that the form of the ballot is a matter for
Congress and the NMB rather than the courts, and in venturing "no opin-
ion as to whether the Board's proposed ballot will best effectuate the pur-
pose of the Act,""0 the Court hinted rather broadly that the NMB could
10 380 U.S. at 671.
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put an end to the confusion. In addition, the Court pointed out that the
employees clearly have the "option of rejecting collective representation."'"
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Stewart, who, incidentally, had first hand ex-
posure to the administration of the Railway Labor Act, expressed the view
that even the Solicitor General's revised ballot did not meet the statutory
requirement of conveying to each employee the choices available to him
under the law. He pointed out that the ballot lies at the heart of the
Board's certification mechanism, and that the Board should confront the
question of its precise form with a correct understanding of the law.
Mr. Justice Stewart's view that the NMB form of ballot denied the
employee his "free and clear choice" was quickly supported by the court
of appeals in Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. National Mediation Board,'"
(hereinafter cited as the ARINC case). There the International Brother-
hood of Teamsters (hereinafter cited as IBT) sought to organize a 400
member craft of ARINC's employees. The Air Line Dispatchers Associa-
tion (hereinafter cited as ALDA) was made a party to the dispute upon
its request. In the ensuing election ALDA collected 74 votes, and IBT
obtained 147 votes. One hundred and seventy-nine employees did not vote
or submitted void votes. The NMB certified the IBT, and ARINC sought
to set aside the certification in the district court. ARINC's action was dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. In affirming, the court of appeals said:
"[S]ince a majority of the employees obviously had voted for some repre-
sentation, the union which became the choice of a majority of those thus
voting should be certified."" Thus the NMB's test for determining "the
free and clear choice" of the employees became an outright presumption
that all employees favoring representation by some union would prefer
representation by any union rather than being unrepresented. Such a pre-
sumption is fallacious. While it is true that a majority of employees did
vote for some sort of representation, it does not follow that those who
voted for ALDA would want the IBT to represent them rather than not
being represented at all.
The NLRB recognizes the dangers of such a presumption. In a situation
where none of the choices receives a majority, and the "no-union" vote is
one of the two highest vote-getters, the NLRB orders a run-off election in
which the ballot affords the employees an opportunity to vote for or
against collective representation. However, the NMB, once it has de-
termined that a majority has.voted,, utterly disregards the fact that votes
not cast constitute votes against representation under the ABNE decision,
and that employees.may not-want a certain union to represent them. As
a result, -the NMB does not use its run-off procedure under its rule which
provides "if in an election -. ; . -no -organization or individual receives a
majority of the legal votes- cast, .. . a second or run-off election shall be
held forthwith'-a procedure obviously appropriate in the ARINC situa-
tion. -By- completely ignoring the choice. of a major segment -of the. .em -
Id. at 669, n.%'
12255 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd, and revd in part, 380 F.2d 624 (D.C.. Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U*S. 912 (1967).
's 380 F.2d at 626-27.
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ployees as it did in the ARINC case, the NMB is disregarding the Supreme
Court's finding that employees do indeed have the "option to reject col-
lective representation."
The long protracted debacle-the Pan American election (Case R-3781)
-illustrates anew the danger of attempting to determine the desires of the
employees without a "no-union" slot on the ballot. The challenging union,
the IBT, filed an application with the NMB on 5 August 1965 requesting
an investigation of a representation dispute among the Pan American World
Airways (hereinafter cited as Pan Am) clerical employees. A mail ballot
election was scheduled in August, 1966 after a lengthy proceeding to de-
termine whether certain employees were members of the unit. However,
the incumbent, the BRC, refused to have its name put on the ballot. Pre-
sumably convinced of its inability to prevail under the NMB rules by
standing for reelection, the BRC's strategy was to remain off the ballot
in hope that less than a majority of the eligible voters would cast valid
ballots for the IBT or any other organization or individuals, and that the
NMB thereupon would dismiss the IBT petition. It then planned to claim
that the status quo ante (the 1946 certification of the BRC) remained
in effect. The BRC election campaign was highlighted by "tear up the
ballot" parties and other tactics designed to persuade employees to refrain
from voting, not for the purpose of expressing their "free and clear
choice" not to be represented by a union, but to keep a particular union in
power irrespective of the employees' wishes. This approach would not have
been possible under a clear cut election procedure such as that of the NLRB.
Ironically, the effectiveness of this strategy was never fully tested, not be-
cause of the intervention of advocates of law, order or clarity, but because
of the circulation of letters over the forged signatures of George Meany
and C. L. Dennis, President of the BRC, stating that the BRC's name had
been erroneously omitted from the ballot, and that a write-in campaign
was being conducted in its behalf. The NMB impounded the ballots and
never counted them, presumably deciding that the forged letters suffici-
ently compounded the existing confusion to justify starting things all over
again.
The NMB ordered a second election which was conducted in Decem-
ber, 1966. Again the BRC remained off the ballot, and its campaign strat-
egy remained unchanged. This time the ballots were counted, 'and out of
6936 eligibles, the IBT received 3091 votes. There were 137 write-ins for
the BRC, and the Transport Workers Union received 284. write-ins. Under
NMB rules, the IBT would have been certified had -the write-ins been de-
clared valid. After many months of deliberation over objections to rulings
made by the mediator in charge of the election,: the NMB on 12 Septem-
ber 1967, set aside this second election because itwas disturbed that the
confusion still remaining from the incidents surrounding the first election
was such.that -the -results of the second election -might not. reflect. the "' free
and clear choice of the employees affected." Whether this concern was
directed at the freedom guaranteed by the statute or merely at the oppor-
tunity to choose between unions was left in doubt! The NMB in its opin-
1969]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ion also recited that much of the confusion delaying the case was attribu-
table to the BRC's absence from the ballot. Thus, in ordering a third
election it invoked what it alleged to be a long-standing and consistently
applied policy of requiring an incumbent to go on the ballot or forswear
representation of the employees involved. This allegation was bitterly con-
tested by the BRC.
The third election was delayed both by a district court order granting
the BRC's application for a preliminary injunction restraining the hold-
ing of an election, and by a stay granted by the court of appeals of its
order reversing the district court. Finally, on 14 October 1968, the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari and the NMB was free to conduct its elec-
tion, which commenced on 27 November 1968. The results were conclu-
sive. The IBT received 4821 votes of a total of 8071 eligibles, the BRC
received 1092. On 14 February 1969, the NMB issued its certification in
Case R-3781, and the IBT became the recognized bargaining agent for
Pan Am's clerical employees some three years, six months and nine days
after the date of its application-far in excess of the thirty days con-
templated by section 2, Ninth of the Act!
The remarks of the court of appeals concerning the confusion and in-
consistencies of the Pan Am case" are most interesting. Commenting on
the NMB's on-the-ballot policy, the court said:
Although we find the Board has statutory power to adopt the on-the-ballot
policy outlined, we confess considerable uneasiness whether the Board has,
with attention to the possible ramifications, evolved a general policy which it
intends to apply in all further representation disputes."5
The court then outlined the BRC's complaint noting that the NMB's al-
legation of a "consistent policy" was not supported by its own case law.
The court found "unsettling" the NMB's reliance on the confusion which
surrounded the first two elections and the confusion resulting from its
failure to put the BRC on the ballot as justification for requiring BRC
to go on the ballot in the third election. It was equally disturbed at the
NMB's apparent view that the ABNE decision required the BRC to be on
the ballot. More significantly, the court expressed its concern at the NMB's
tendency to profess itself required by dicta in opinions of courts which
themselves emphasize the nearly unlimited powers of the Board:
The choice of what policy to follow is essentially for the Board to make.
It is, however, for that very reason disturbing that on the one hand the
courts refuse to involve themselves deeply in the substance of these questions,
emphasizing the nearly unlimited powers of the Board, while on the other,
the Board is heard to protest that its answers are mandated by the need for
application of dictum in judicial opinion. This Alphonse-Gaston interplay is
disquieting, with all due allowance for the possibility that the Board has given
full consideration to the considerable problems, and uses court precedent as
a palliative against pressures rather than as a prime mover of Board action."6
14402 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 848 (1968).
I5 1d. at 203.
"Id. at 204.
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These nearly unlimited powers of the NMB carry concomitant responsi-
bilities. Its policies and actions are unreviewable unless they are "so plain-
ly beyond the bounds of the Act, or ... so clearly in defiance of it, as to
warrant the immediate intervention of an equity court," as the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has said.
Faced with the inescapable conclusion that it has not provided a "free
and clear choice" by employees in representation proceedings, the
awareness of the delay and confusion which this failure can produce, as
illustrated by the Pan Am clerical situation, should force the NMB to
realize its responsibility to carry out statutory intent by promulgating on
its own motion rules to provide a "no-union" slot on the ballot.
